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Overweight and obesity are among the most pressing health challenges today. 
Nationally, the current annual cost of overweight and obesity is nearing $117 billion (US 
DHHS, 2001). Meanwhile, the sudden increase in childhood obesity in the United States 
is especially well documented and alarming. An estimated 14% of children between the 
ages of 6 and 17 are at-risk for overweight; an additional 11% are overweight (Troiano 
and Flegal). Many negative childhood health disorders (e.g. asthma, diabetes etc.) are 
associated with obesity. In addition, because of the established positive relationship 
between childhood obesity and adult obesity (e.g. Serdula, et al. 1993), the future adult 
morbidity rates are expected to increase in the future. Consequently, the already high 
economic cost associated with obesity is expected to increase dramatically in the future.  
The factors affecting the childhood obesity are many and not well understood. In 
the standard nutrition literature, obesity is a function of the balance between energy 
intake and energy expenditure (Hoffman and Sawaya). Energy intake and expenditure are 
influenced by genetic factors and environmental factors. The changing family and social 
environment are shown to be the likely culprit in the case of childhood obesity (e.g. 
Chou, Grossman, and Saffer). As Lindsay et al. pointed out, parents are key to 
developing a home environment that fosters their children’s development of lifelong 
habits, such as eating patterns and physical lifestyles. Household food expenditure and 
parental time allocation are two obviously important home environmental factors. What 
are the changes in those two factors recently and what are the relationships between those 
changes and the rising childhood obesity? 
Adult time allocation has changed greatly over the last three decades as more 
women have entered the labor force. Less time at home and more time at work results in 
less time available for food preparation and active leisure (Chou, Grossman, and Saffer).   3
Meanwhile, technological changes occurred in the food sector has led to increased 
quantity and variety of food consumed (Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro). Higher frequency 
of family meal skipping, declined activity time with their children and increased 
convenience food consumption will be likely to negatively impact children’s diet patterns 
and lifestyles, ceteris paribus. 
This paper aims at exploring the influence of household food expenditures, parental 
time allocation and other parental factors on children’s obesity-related health outcomes 
while focusing on examining the potential differences between the marginal effects of 
paternal choices and maternal choices. 
 
Literature Summary 
No known studies have examined the interrelationship between household food 
expenditures, parental time allocation, and children’s obesity-related health outcomes. 
However, this research topic falls naturally into the area of “household production of 
health” which is being studied by a variety of disciplines: anthropology, social 
psychology, and economics. Each discipline has its own sets of factors and model 
frameworks to work on although they do overlap to a certain degree. To conduct a 
thorough examination on HHPH, it calls for interdisciplinary quantitative and qualitative 
research work (Berman, Kendall, and Bhattacharyya; Haveman and Wolfe). This study 
incorporates nutrition literature and sociological factors into economic analysis. 
 
Economic Literature Summary 
In economic literature, there has been an enormous amount of work done on household 
behavior modeling both in theoretical development and in empirical applications.   4
However, there is little research on examining the influence of parents on their children’s 
health outcomes. The children’s attainment literature does explore the influence of the 
parental choices on children’s attainment. But in those studies, the attainment definitions 
do not include children’s obesity-related health outcomes and parental time allocation 
choices are not considered as potential determinants. The research question we are 
examining covers three key areas: household health production, interaction between 
parents, and parents-child interaction. Because the related literature is enormous, we will 
only discuss those directly related. 
Becker (1965) introduced the household production model (HPM) into the 
traditional consumer behavior analysis. It models households as consumers as well as 
producers. One of the household goods produced can be children’s health outcomes. The 
theory development has gone through several waves of modifications. 
In the original HPM, the household acts as a single decision-making unit even 
though the household consists of different individuals. The associated household model is 
called “unitary model”. The properties of demand functions and the “income pooling 
hypothesis” derived from the model were repeatedly rejected in the literature (e.g. 
Bourguignon et al.; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales).
1 Furthermore, the unitary model, 
much like the income pooling hypothesis, implicitly treats all time allocated to the 
children as the same regardless of the source. Consequently, the potential difference of 
time allocation effects between mothers and fathers cannot be assessed. 
This study adapts the latter theoretical development, “non-unitary models”, which 
treats the household members as distinct individuals with common interests as well as 
                                                 
1 The “income pooling hypothesis” states that the household pools all non-labor income together to 
optimize the household utility, however, the source of unearned income does not affect the intra-household 
resource allocation.   5
conflicts. This paper builds on one of the approach called “collective model” which was 
developed by Chiappori (1988, 1992), and Apps and Rees (1988). Instead of imposing a 
particular bargaining rule, it assumes only that the household decision-making process 
will always result in Pareto efficient outcomes. This Pareto efficiency assumption has 
been justified as the natural result of repeated long-term games, with the household 
dynamic as one example (Browning and Chiappori).  
Most work on collective models has modeled the behavior of households without 
children. Some refinements have included children in the model by treating children as 
public consumption goods for adult household members (e.g. Bourguignon) or as 
individual household members with no influence in the production process (e.g., Apps 
and Rees 2002; Xie). This is not a very appealing approach for considering children’s 
physical health productions (especially obesity-related ones)  in that a child can have 
increasing control over energy intake and expenditure as it grows older. 
Modeling parents-child interaction started from Becker’s “Rotten Kid Theorem”. 
This theorem describes family members’ interaction with a two-stage game and can be 
put into standard principal-agent theory language (Becker 1981). The similar model has 
been used in children’s attainment literature (Cigno, Luporini and Pettini; Weinberg; 
Burton et al.). The two-stage game is an intuitive way to model interaction between 
parents and child which this paper uses. 
 
Sociological Literature Summary 
There are several factors sociology considers in the HHPH: role theory, work flexibility, 
work commitment, work-to-home spillover, parents’ power difference, and heredity.   6
Role theory states that there are many socially prescribed roles that individuals take 
on which demand individual resource allocation. When role demands exceed the time and 
energy resources of an individual, there will be either conflict between different roles or 
within the same role where partners share the work load and create stress (Pearlin).  
Work stress is an important factor affecting working parents’ behavior. Negative 
emotional and physical consequences associated with work stress have been found in the 
literature (e.g. Karlsson, Knuttson and Lindahl; Rau and Triemer). Work flexibility and 
work commitment are two important causes. Several studies suggest that work stress can 
also lead to tension in spousal relationships and have a negative impact on parents-child 
interaction (e.g. Crouter and Bumpus; Kinnunen, Geurts, and Mauno). This describes 
another sociological factor in family life: some roles’ conflict spills over to other roles. 
Work-to-home spillover is the most relevant one for working parents. Work flexibility, 
work commitment and work-to-home spillovers are also found to affect family eating 
habits (e.g. Devine et al.).  
The sociological literature also shows that the power difference between husband 
and wife will benefit the one with the higher status (e.g., Blumberg). This suggests the 
potential linkage between parents’ power differences and household decision-making. 
Heredity has also been proved to be an important factor in children’s intake and 
outcomes. Several studies have suggested the positive relationship between parental BMI 
and their children’s BMI (e.g., Agras et al.). 
A lot of work in the field of sociology has focused on health determinants. Within 
this literature, some have considered children’s health outcomes, but they do not 
specifically analyze parental time devotion effects on children’s health outcomes and 
there is no common framework to guide the empirical variable selection.   7
Theoretical Model 
The theoretical model considers a multi-person household with two parents and one 
child, each with his/her own utility function. We model the parents-child interaction as a 
two-stage Stackleberg game while keeping collective model structure within the father-
mother interaction. By doing so, we are able to disentangle the individual parent’s 
interaction with the child and derive the child’s health production function with parental 
time allocation variables as arguments. So we can empirically analyze the parental 
influence on the child’s health production outcomes in a theoretically consistent way. 
 
Production Function 
We define the child’s obesity-related health production function based on nutrition 
literature. The metabolism of nutrients (i.e., energy) in the human body is mainly about 
energy balance (Hoffman and Sawaya):  
(1)  Energy Intake = Energy Output ±  Energy Stored. 
This indicates that the children’s obesity-related health production function should 
have two main components: energy intake and energy output. Those two components are 
influenced by numerous factors and we define our function components accordingly. The 
children’s obesity-related health, H, is determined by the following production function 
based on equation (1):  








f E f f = , where n() is the nested 
energy intake production function and the other captures the factors influencing the   8
energy output.
2 tE is child’s time spent in exercising, K is a vector of individual type 
variables for the child (k), the father (K
F) and the mother (K
M). 
The nutrient intake, n, is influenced by several factors. Child’s food input choices 










f T ) capture the composition of the meal; and along with child’s time spent in food 
consumption (tf), they capture the food availability to the child. tf  and k also capture the 
palatability factor. Home environment (EH), peer influences (EP) and child and parents’ 
type variables capture the social and family influence while the type variables also 
capture psychological state of the child. The production function (equation (2)) is 
assumed to exhibit non-increasing returns and to be twice differentiable. 
We should note that when all the energy intake and energy output related variables 
are fixed, the only way the obesity-related physical health outcome will change is through 
the person’s genetics. Genetics are not influenced by the amount of parent-child time. So 
in our model, the parental time spent with the child only can indirectly influence the 
child’s health outcome through optimal solutions. 
 
Optimization Framework 
Our model treats parents and the child as individuals with different preferences and 
own sets of choices. Each individual’s utility function is strictly quasi-concave and at 
least twice continuously differentiable. The child’s utility function is defined as: 




C o E f E E T T t t t H u . 
                                                 
2 The energy output has three components: basal metabolic rate, thermogenic component and physical 
activity and arousal. The first two are related to age, gender, state of health and fitness, etc. The last one 
depends on the intensity and the duration of the activity involved (Hoffman and Sawaya).   9
The child divides his/her own time among food consumption (tf), exercise (tE) and other 
residual activities (to). The child will maximize his/her own utility, equation (3), by 
making his/her own decisions on the set of choices, ) , , , ( o E f f t t t x , while facing the 
production function constraint (equation (2) ) and the time constraint. Father’s and 
mother’s time spent with the child, (
F
C T , 
M
C T ), enter the child’s utility function directly to 
capture the direct welfare the child gets from spending time with his/her parents. 
We allow the parents to have their individual specific preferences. Their individual 
utility function is then: 











i ⋅ , i = F, M. 
i
o X  is the parent’s individual composite market good consumption, with the price set to 
unity. EW depicts parent’s work environment. Each parent will allocation his/her own 
time among: time spent with the child (
i
C T ), food preparation (
i
f T ), market work (
i
w T ), and 
the other residual activities (
i
o T ). 
In the Beckerian sense, both of them are “egoistic” toward each other but exhibit 
the combination of “caring” and “altruistic” toward their child. This means that, among 
the parents, each parent’s own consumption and time allocation choices have no effect on 
the other. However, they both care about their child’s welfare, u, in a way that the child’s 
welfare outcome will bring direct utility to them and they do not care how the welfare is 
achieved except through health outcome, H. Meanwhile both parents do not merely want 
their child to feel “happy” (achieve its maximum utility level).  Instead, they want the   10
child to have a certain level of health outcome even though this may bring the child a 
certain level of disutility.
3 
Following the collective model framework, we only assume that parents’ decision 
process will lead to Pareto efficient allocation results between them. The parents will 
form a parents’ utility function, v, using an implicit weight, W (Chiappori 1992).
4 W 
summarizes the decision process and determines the final location of the optimal 
solutions on the Pareto frontier. The parents’ utility function, v, is then a weighted 
average of the parent’s individual utility functions:  
(5) 
M F v W v v ⋅ + = .
5 The parents will make their decisions on the set of choices, 
























f T T T T T T T T X X X X , while facing the child’s health 
production function constraint (equation (2)), a household budget constraint and two 
individual time constraints. The budget constraint is: 
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6 where w
i is individual wage rate, 
i
w T  
is individual market work time and I
i is individual unearned income. 
 
The Two-Stage Game 
The first issue for setting up a Stackleberg game is to choose the leader and the follower. 
In the context of parental time allocation influence on the child’s obesity-related health 
                                                 
3 For example, the child and his parents may have different perceptions about overweight and obesity. The 
overweight or obese child may not feel any discomfort or he may only feel the peer pressure and self-
esteem struggling; the parents may concern about the child’s health status and related medical burden. Then 
the conflict will arise due to this perception gap. 
4 Browning and Chiappori call it a “distribution of power” function and it generally depends on the 
“distribution factors” that affect the distribution of “power” within the household but do not affect the 
preferences directly, such as individual wage rates and unearned income. 
5 The W function here represents the ratio of the mother’s power over the father’s power.  Its value can be 
greater than 1 in the case of the mother having a larger distribution power in the parents decision process. 
6 We normalize the composite commodity and the food inputs price to unity. The LHS of equation (8) can 
be treated as the sum of the expenditures. The equality sign is based on non-satiation assumption.   11
outcome, it is more realistic to assume that parents are the ones who set the family rules 
(act as the leader) and the child is the follower. The testing of the game structure 
assumption is beyond the scope of this paper and is one of the future study topics.  
Now we have the following Stackleberg game structure. Stage 1: The two parents 
are acting as the Stackleberg leader and they maximize their collective utility function, v, 
for any given decision choice of the child. Stage 2: The child observes the parental 
decisions then makes his/her own choices.  
We assume perfect information flow between parents and the child and within 
parents’ interaction. It is because: First, efficient outcomes are naturally resulted from 
long-term interaction in multi-person households, and asymmetric information will 
weaken the efficiency conditions; Second, it will complicate our analysis and distract us 
from the purpose of this study. 
 
Empirical Model 
The two-stage game presented above leads to two specifications for the child’s obesity-
related health production function, H. 
In the second stage of the game, the child makes decisions on his/her own food 
choice and time allocations taking the parental decisions as exogenous. The child’s 
optimal choices are functions of the parental decisions and the other exogenous variables: 












f . So the optimal health production function is: 
(7) ) ; , (














f = . 
In the first stage of the game, the parents make their decisions based on W, to 
achieve Pareto efficient resource allocation. Because they are able to act before the child, 
the parents can form their best responses to any given set of the child’s optimal decisions.   12
The parents’ optimal choices are functions of the exogenous variables of the model: 
) , , , , , , , ( K E E E I I w w W P H
M F M F . This stage gives us: 
(8) ) ; , (
* * * * * * K t N H H E = ) , , , , , , , ( K E E E I I w w H W P H
M F M F = . 
Equation (8) is the reduced form equation of the model because all its exogenous 
variables are predetermined in both stages of the game. However, it does not provide us 
with the information needed to disentangle the partial effects of the parental decisions.
7 
Equation (7) preserves the relationship between parental choices and the child’s obesity-
related health outcome, which is the focus of our study. We use this equation to specify 
our empirical production function. 
Rosenzweig and Schultz point out that, for the general health production problem, 
the health technology estimation should take into account health inputs’ self-selection 
issues and this type of estimation must be obtained from a behavioral model that treats 
health inputs as choice variables, which we have done in the theoretical model. The 
parental stage of the game provides us with instrument choices for parental health inputs. 
We can estimate equation (7) using two-stage least squares (2SLS) to obtain consistent 
estimators. However, the 2SLS estimation, although achieving consistency, is not 
efficient because it ignores the reduced-form restrictions implied by the theoretical model 
(Court; Rosenzweig and Schultz). A potential and achievable efficiency can be gained if 
we put the structural equations of interest together with any number of reduced form 
equations and estimate all of them jointly as a system (Court; Rosenzweig and Schultz). 
Available data points and the degree of freedom problem are common among cross-
sectional data sets, and is the case with our collected data set as well. By estimating an 
                                                 
7 As Rosenzweig and Schultz point out, the reduced form health equation (e.g., equation (8)) does not 
provide information on underlying household health technology.   13
empirical system instead of a single empirical equation, we also gain the degree of 
freedom by increasing the number of available data points. 
Before discussing the identification issue of this empirical system, we need to verify 
that the data needs of this empirical system match our collected household survey data 





f X X , have to be replaced with the household’s food expenditure,  f X ;  we have to 




w T T , has been predetermined and remains 
constant in the short run (Amuwo et al.). 
8 The total time available changes from 24 hours 
per day for all individuals to non-work time available per day for individuals,  ) , (
M F T T . 
The modified empirical system allowing for data limitations becomes: 
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f f T T T T X B = . 
Equation (10) is a group of five reduced form health input equations with the same set of 
exogenous variables.
9 So this empirical system consists of six equations with five 
reduced form equations (equation group (10)) and one structural equation (equation (9)). 
The five equations in (10) are already identified by their reduced form properties. The 
identification issue of this empirical system rests on the identification of equation (9). 
There are five exogenous variables,  ) , , , , ( W
M F M F E T T Y Y , that are excluded from 
health production function (9) and five included endogenous variables, 








f f T T T T X , that are in the equation. This means that equation (9) is exactly 
                                                 
8 This can be a reasonable assumption for cross-sectional data which covers a short period of time. 
9 They are the reduced form health input demand functions derived from parental stage of the game.   14
identified if all the variables are scalars.
10 The work environment variable, EW, may 
include the work flexibility and the work commitment which will make equation (9) 
over-identified. 
If we organize the system by putting the endogenous variables all to the left hand 
side of the equations, the associated left hand side coefficient matrix is a special case of 
an upper triangular matrix which makes it a the triangular system (Greene; Kmenta). The 
system is qualified as a general triangular system with non-diagonal disturbance 
covariance matrix, Σ, because of the possible endogeneity problem.  
The general triangular system can be estimated consistently by using the seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) method. However, the efficiency will only be gain if the 
covariance matrix, Σ, is known which is almost never the case in practice (Lahiri and 
Schmidt). Lahiri and Schmidt suggest using the iterated SUR (ITSUR) to achieve the 
algebraically same results as the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimator. 
However the covariance matrix from the ITSUR may not be consistent (Prucha).
11 It is 
well known that when the covariance matrix, Σ, is unknown, the FIML and 3SLS are 
equally efficient. We choose to use the iterated 3SLS (IT3SLS) as the procedure for our 
triangular system estimation.  
As is common in cross-sectional analysis, the instruments we have may be weak 
which will result in poor and misleading asymptotic properties (Park and Davis). So both 
the ITSUR and IT3SLS results will be presented and the robustness across both 
estimators will be examined. Our triangular system has a well laid out theoretical 
framework support which minimizes the potential equation misspecification. We choose 
                                                 
10 As Greene points out, in general, a model that passes the order condition will meet the rank condition. 
11 A consistent covariance matrix estimator can be obtained by using the parameter estimates from the 
iterated SUR as starting values for a FIML routine and taking the standard errors from the routine (Prucha).   15
the semi-log functional form for the production function and the linear functional form 
for all reduced form health input demand equations.
12 
 
Data and Summary Statistics 
The main reason for the conceptual limitations in this line of research has been the lack of 
data rich enough to consider more sophisticated models.  The desirable data set should 
not only include children’s health status and nutrient intake but also have detailed food 
expenditure and parental time diary records on individual levels.
13  
This study utilizes a unique first-hand multi-disciplinary household survey data set. 
It not only covers sociological aspects of the family, financial structure information and 
demographic details, but also provides dietary intake details and two-consecutive-day 
time diary records. Also the above detailed information is available for each participating 
member of the household (two parents and one child). The data set was collected between 
July 2001 and June 2002 and the data were drawn from over 300 households in Houston 
(MSA), Texas. The sample was generated through random digital dialing. The survey 
covered children of age 9 to 11 or 13 to 15. Getting complex data from children under 9 
years old is problematic and children usually undergo puberty at age 12 which can greatly 
influence their diet intake and outcome measures (Crocket and Peterson). 
 
Data Specification 
Table 1 reports detailed descriptions of variables used in the empirical analysis 
including variable names, definition descriptions, and units. We will focus on presenting 
the data generation process for the time variables and some key variables. 
                                                 
12 The functional form selection should be considered for future study. 
13 As Haveman and Wolfe pointed out, many existing data sets cannot meet this degree of richness.   16
For this study, we use a continuous BMI score as the indicator for the child’s 
obesity-related health outcome, H. BMI scores were calculated from the child’s weight 
and height anthropometric measurements according to the BMI definition. Household 
total monthly food expenditure, f X , is a sum of the following three spending categories: 
(a) money spent on groceries and other food items eaten at home; (b) money spent on 
take-out and food delivered eaten at home; (c) money spent on going out to eat. 
There are two parental time allocation variables that enter the child’s obesity-related 




f T T , and the 




C T T . These time variables are averaged minutes 
per day generated from the two-day time diary record using primary activities as the 
criteria. Parental time spent in food preparation includes: the time spent in preparing 
meals, drinks and snacks, and the time spent in food clean-up and buying take-out food. 
Parental time spent with the child is a residual time amount which is derived by 
subtracting the total of parental time not spent with the child from the total available time 
in a day (1440 minutes).
14 The last parental time variable is the total non-working time 
available to each parent,  ) , (
M F T T . This variable is also a residual time and is equal to the 
total time per day (1440 minutes) minus parental time market work time per day. 
Our empirical model has work environment, EW, as an exogenous variable so our 
sample is a subset of the data set and covers only those households with two working 
parents. In our sample, the two-consecutive-day survey period varies across individual 
households. It is important to distinguish the time allocation pattern for workday versus 
                                                 
14 It should be mentioned that this measure does not distinguish between the time spent in activities that 
contribute to energy intake (e.g., consuming food) and those that qualify as energy expenditure (e.g., 
exercising). Although this measure does capture the general quantity of parental time spent with the child, 
it cannot fully depict the quality of the time.   17
non-workday. For this study, we follow the following time variable generation rule: The 
generated time allocation variables should represent workday patterns when at least one 
workday is reported; they should capture non-workday patterns when the two days are 
both non-workdays. 
The theoretical model presented above contains three types of environmental 
variables: home, peers and parent’s work. They capture home and social influences. The 
home environment, EH, is captured by a factor, created from the principal factors factor 
analysis. This factor captures work-to-family spillover and depicts the home environment 
caused by work-related negative impacts such as no energy, no time for family and poor 
father/mother role performance. A high score indicates that the parent is more likely to 
experience work-to-family spillover. The data set does not provide good measurement for 
the child’s peer influence. The parent’s work environment, EW, has two main factors: 
work flexibility and work commitment. We use two variables to capture work flexibility 
for each parent: work hour flexibility and work day flexibility. The value ranges from 1 
to 3 or from inflexible to highly flexible. Work commitment captures the importance 
parents place on their jobs relative to other roles in life. The answer ranges from 1 to 5 
indicating the parent’s commitment to work from very low to very high. 
We use parent’s BMI scores to capture heredity effects and parent’s education level 
and active level to depict parent’s types. We use two rank variables, (ToBuy, ToSpend), 
generated from two decision power related survey questions to capture the relative power 
difference between the father and the mother on two food-related decision-makings: 
whether to buy groceries; how much to spend on groceries. As the rank increase, the 
father will have relatively more decision power on the category. 
   18
Summary Statistics 
The entire data set has a maximum of 325 household records and each household record 
has three sets of data: the father’s data, the mother’s data and the child’s data. We report 
only the sample that contains households with complete information from both parents 
and the child for the variables of interest. The empirical analysis was conducted on the 
sample without splitting age groups first (pooled model), then on two sub-samples: 
younger group (age 9 to 11) and older group (age 13 to 15). It allows us to explore the 
potentially different parental impact on children as compared to adolescents. 
The summary statistics for the pooled model are reported in Table 2. We will 
discuss key variables of interests. The sample size is 125 observations. The average total 
household monthly expenditure on food is about $690.64 with a huge variation: the 
minimum is $210.00 and the maximum is $1,579.00. The fathers’ average total income is 
larger than the mothers’ average total income and also is of less variability compared to 
the mothers’: the coefficients of variations (CVs) are 68% and 105% respectively. On 
average, mothers devote more time to the family compared to fathers: Mothers spend an 
average of about one hour a day in food preparation (65 minutes), while fathers spend an 
average of 20 minutes. The average time mothers spent with their children is about one 
and a half hours (90 minutes) while fathers spend an average of one hour and nineteen 
minutes (79 minutes). It is a consistent pattern that fathers’ time devotion to the family 
has larger variability: The CVs of the food preparation time are 122% and 83% for the 
father and the mother respectively; the CVs of the parental time spent with the child are 
142% and 102% respectively. Meanwhile, mothers have more available non-working 
time per day on average compared to fathers and with less variability. In the sample, 90%   19
of the fathers and 80% of the mothers reported at least one workday time allocation 
pattern.  
The children’s BMI cut-off points vary according to the children’s gender and age 
and the mean here does not have clear cut-off points to compare with. Fathers have 
higher average BMIs than mothers (27 vs. 25) and both means belong to the adult 
“overweight” category (25≤BMI<30). Mothers have more variability in BMI than 
fathers. In our sample, 49% are boys, 79% of the children are non-Hispanic white, 11% 
are Hispanic, 88% of the children are pubescent. 
After splitting the sample, we have 59 observations in the younger group and 66 
observations in the older group. These two groups’ summary statistics are presented in 
Table 3 and 4 respectively. The average monthly household food expenditure is similar 
across the two groups with the average of $674.35 in the younger group and $705.20 in 
the older group and they are of same variability (about 34%).  
On average, parents with older children spend relatively more time in food 
preparation compared to those who have younger children. The difference is larger in 
father’s food preparation time devotion: fathers spend average 15 minutes a day in 
younger group and 24 minutes a day in older group. On the other hand, parents of young 
children spend more time with children compared to those of older children: in the 
younger group, fathers spend an average of one hour and twenty minutes per day (80 
minutes) with their children while mothers spend around two hours per day (112 
minutes); in the older group, fathers spend about one hour and eighteen minutes per day 
(78 minutes) on average with their children and mothers spend about one hour and twelve 
minutes (72 minutes). Mothers of younger children spend relatively more time with   20
children than fathers while fathers of older children spend more time than mothers. 
Fathers’ time devotions have larger variability compare to mothers in both groups.  
The younger group has a maximum BMI of 29 and the older children sample has a 
maximum BMI of 45. These two maximum scores well exceed the 95
th percentile BMI-
for-age cut-off points for both boys and girls.
15 
 
Empirical Results: Obesity-Related Health Production Function 
We conducted IT3SLS and ITSUR on the triangular system. Because the focus of our 
study is on parental influences on children’s obesity-related health outcomes, we will 
focus on discussing the results for production function and briefly discuss the reduced 
form health input demand functions results. The estimation results across the three 
models are similar with minor switches happening when the sample split. So we will 
mainly discuss the pooled model results for some key variables and compare the sub-
samples results when it is needed. 
Table 5 presents the detail estimation results for the pooled model and the two age 
groups. The IT3SLS and ITSUR results are presented side-by-side. There exist 
discrepancies across the two estimators overall, especially in terms of the numbers of the 
significant variables, although most variables have the consistent signs and magnitudes 
across the two estimators. As stated before, the main concern for the IT3SLS estimation 
is the weak instruments issue which is the common problem cross sectional studies are 
facing. Although we have theoretical guidance in the instruments selection, we may not 
                                                 
15 According to the BMI-for-age charts developed by the National Center for Health Statistics, the 95
th 
percentile for boys of age 11 is 23.2 and girls of age 11 is 24.1, the 95
th percentile for boys of age 15 is 26.8 
while for girls is 28.1.   21
have good data to measure them well. So we will focus on discussing those statistically 
significant variables in ITSUR results. 
In the pooled model, four out of five parental decision variables are statistically 
significant. The total household monthly food expenditure, Xf, has positive impact on the 
child’s BMI outcome. A $100 increase in Xf leads to a 3% increase in the child’s BMI.
16 
Mothers’ food preparation time, 
M
f T , is positively related to the child’s obesity-related 
health outcomes. Every 100 minute increase in 
M
f T is associated with about a 8% increase 
in the children’s BMI. The child’s BMI in log form tends to decrease when parents spend 
more time with him/her. Fathers’ have larger marginal influences compared to mothers: 
for every 100 more minutes fathers’ spend with their children, the children’s BMI will 
decrease by 8% while the same minutes increase in mothers’ time with their children will 
bring a 3% decrease in the children’s BMI. The magnitude difference is consistent with 
the diminishing returns to parental time inputs: as shown in Table 2, fathers on average 
spend less time with their children compared to mothers. We tested the paternal and 
maternal time impact difference. The test confirms the difference for parent-child time at 
5% significance level. 
The children will increase their BMI by 2% when they are one year older. Those 
children who participated in active exercise for 30 minutes at least one day in the past 14 
days tend to have higher BMI compared to those who had no active exercise at all in the 
past 14 days. It may be consistent with the children’s growth or may be that those 
exercise effects are out-weighted by the energy intake effects.
17 Parents’ BMI is 
                                                 
16 The production function is in semi-log form. So the slope coefficient measures the relative change in 
health outcomes for a given absolute change in the value of the explanatory variable. 
17 Children who exercise more may tend to eat more afterwards.   22
positively correlated with the children’s BMI which is consistent with the heredity effects 
shown in the literature. 
 
Younger Age Group vs. Older Age Group 
We will only compare and discuss those statistically significant results. Among the five 
parental decision variables, the fathers’ and mothers’ time spent with the childildren are 
statistically significant at 5% significance level across the two age groups and the signs 
are consistent. In younger group, fathers’ time with their children exhibits slightly larger 
marginal impact on the children’s BMI outcomes compared to mothers: for every 100 
minutes increase in fathers’ time with their children, there will be a 7.3% decrease in the 
children’s BMI; while the same increase in mothers’ time brings a 7.1% decrease in the 
children’s BMI. The older group shows the opposite: for every 100 minutes increase in 
mothers’ and fathers’ time with their children, there will be a 6.7% and a 4.4% decrease 
in their children’s BMI respectively. This pattern switch is consistent with diminishing 
returns: mothers on average spend more time with their children compared to fathers in 
younger group while the pattern is switched in older group. In both groups, the household 
monthly expenditure does not show up as a significant factor. Among parental food 
preparation time variables, only fathers’ food preparation time is negatively correlated 
with the children’s health outcomes in younger group. There will be a 3.6% decrease in 
the younger children’s BMI when fathers spend 10 more minutes in food preparation. 
Mothers’ work-to-home spillover is significantly positively correlated with their 
children’s health outcomes only in younger group: one-unit increase in mothers’ work-to-
home spillover brings about a 9.8% increase in the children’s BMI. Mothers’ BMI is 
positively correlated with the children’s BMI in older group. In younger group, the more   23
control fathers’ have in terms of grocery spending amounts the lower the children’s BMI 
is going to be. There is statistically significant difference between the marginal effects of 
paternal and maternal time spent with the child in either sub-group. 
 
Empirical Results: Health Input Demand Functions 
We have five reduced form demand functions for health inputs and they are final reduced 
form equations of the model. Theoretically, this means that the IT3SLS and ITSUR will 
yield similar estimation results, so in this section we will present only the ITSUR 
estimators.
18 Table 6, 7 and 8 report the five equation estimation results for the pooled 
model, the younger group, and the older group, respectively. The results are similar 
across three models and we will focus on the pooled model and mention the differences 
when it is needed. 
Both parents’ individual total incomes have a positive relationship with the total 
household monthly food expenditure. Every additional $1,000 increase in the fathers’ and 
mothers’ individual income brings about $1.65 and $1.81 increase in the total household 
monthly food expenditure respectively. Mother’s income effect on food expenditure 
remains strong in younger age group while father’s income effect remains strong in older 
age group. Fathers have more significant influence on household food expenditure 
compared to mothers. Fathers’ work-to-home spillover level and workday flexibility level 
and mothers’ work commitment level are positively influencing the expenditure while 
fathers’ commitment level shows the opposite effect. The more power fathers have in 
terms of deciding how much to spend in grocery, the more households spent in food. 
                                                 
18 The IT3SLS and ITSUR are the same in terms of signs and significance and the magnitudes only differ 
by a very small amounts.   24
The results show the complementary effect of the parents’ time and money 
resources, i.e., the more income mothers earn, the more time fathers have to spend in 
food preparation (every $1,000 increase will result in a 0.28 minutes increase)  while the 
less time mothers spent in food preparation (about 0.31 minutes decrease) which is the 
individual resource substitution effect. The income effect on parental child care time only 
show up in older age group: the more income mothers’ earn, the less time mothers will 
spend with the child (every $1,000 increase will result in a 0.99 minute decrease). In 
general, mothers’ show more significant influence on the parental time allocation 
compared to fathers: mothers’ work-to-home spillover level and work commitment level 
are negatively influencing father-child time allocation. One puzzling fact is that mothers 
spend average more time with their children during their workday.
19 This result shows up 
in the younger age group as well while the older age group results show that fathers 
spend less time with their children during their workday. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper models a household with two parents and one child. The model treats the 
mother, the father, and the child as three separate agents with individual preferences. The 
parents’ interaction is modeled within the collective household model framework. To 
capture the dynamics between the parents and the child, the parents-child interaction is 
modeled as a two-stage Stackleberg game where the child is allowed to have certain 
decision choices of his/her own. This game structure allows the parents to influence the 
child’s health outcome separately while allowing the child to have influence in the 
household decision-making process. 
                                                 
19 The questions are: Will mothers spend more time doing multi-tasking during workdays? Will the quality 
of time matter? They will be our future research topics.   25
A general triangular system with one child’s health production equation and five 
reduced-form health input demand equations is derived and estimated, in order to gain 
both consistency and efficiency. The IT3SLS is the chosen estimation procedure for 
consistent and efficient results. In case of weak instruments, both ITSUR and IT3SLS 
results are presented to access the robustness across these estimators. The empirical 
estimation is performed for three systems: a pooled model, the younger children model 
(of age 9 to 11), and the older children model (of age 13 to 15). 
The total household monthly food expenditure has positive impact on the child’s 
BMI outcome and the impact does not show up after the sample is divided into two age 
groups. Both parents’ time spent with the child are important and both show negatively 
significant impact on the child’s BMI outcomes in all models and the pool model 
confirms the statistical difference between paternal and maternal time spent with the 
child. Other mother-related variables show more influence on the children’s BMI: 
Mother’s time spent in food preparation is positively related to the children’s BMI in the 
pooled model; Mother’s work-to-home stress spillover is positively related to their 
children’s BMI in younger age group; Mother’s BMI is positively related to their BMI in 
older age group and the pooled model. 
For those health inputs demands, both parents’ individual total incomes have a 
positive relationship with the total household monthly food expenditure. There exists a 
complementary relationship between mothers’ income and fathers’ time allocation. 
Fathers have more significant influence on household food expenditure compared to 
mothers. The individual resource substitution effect shows in older age group: mothers’ 
income is negatively related to their time spent with the children. In general, mothers’ 
show more significant influence on the parental time allocation compared to fathers.   26
The main contribution of this study is that it develops a general theoretical 
framework to capture the dynamics between the parents and the child. Based on this 
theoretical model, empirical analysis and future research can be conducted in a 
theoretically consistent way.   27
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Variable Description 
 
Variable Description  Unit 
Dependent Variables (LHS Variables in the triangular system) 
TotExp   Total household monthly food expenditure (FAH+Takeout+FAFH)  Dollars/month 
FatherPrepTime   Father's time spent in food preparation (prepare meal, drink, cleanup, takeout purchase)  Minutes/day 
MotherPrepTime   Mother's time spent in food preparation  Minutes/day 
FatherChildTime   Father's time spent with the child  Minutes/day 
MotherChildTime Mother's time spent with the child  Minutes/day 
KidBMI   The Child's Body Mass Index  Kilograms/meters
2 
    
Independent Variables (RHS Variables in the triangular system) 
Economic Variables 
FatherIncome  Father's individual total income (earned + unearned)  Dollars/year 
MotherIncome Mother's  total income (earned + unearned)  Dollars/year 
FatherTime Father's  total  non-work time  Minutes/day 
MotherTime  Mother's total non-work time  Minutes/day 
FatherWorkDay  Father's working day indicator: 1 if it is the working-day pattern; 0 otherwise  0 or 1 
MotherWorkDay  Mother's working day indicator: 1 if it is the working-day pattern; 0 otherwise  0 or 1 
    
Sociological Variables 
FatherSpillover Father's  work-to-home spillover  Factor 
MotherSpillover  Mother's work-to-home spillover  Factor 
FatherHR  Father's work hour flexibility – 1 is inflexible; 2 is somewhat flexible; 3 is very flexible  Rank 
MotherHR  Mother's work hour flexibility – 1 is inflexible; 2 is somewhat flexible; 3 is very flexible  Rank 
FatherDay  Father's work day flexibility – 1 is inflexible; 2 is somewhat flexible; 3 is very flexible  Rank 
MotherDay Mother's  work day flexibility – 1 is inflexible; 2 is somewhat flexible; 3 is very flexible  Rank 
FatherCommit  Father's commitment to work – 1 to 5 means work is of increasing priority in life   Rank 
MotherCommit  Mother's commitment to work – 1 to 5 means work is of increasing priority in life  Rank 
    
Control Variables 
Age Child's  age  Year 
Gender  Child's gender – 1 is for male; 0 is for female  0 or 1 
White  Child's ethnicity – 1 is for white; 0 otherwise  0 or 1 
Hispanic  Child's ethnicity – 1 is for Hispanic; 0 otherwise  0 or 1 
Puberty  Child ’s Puberty Stage – 1 if pubescent; 0 for pre-pubescent  0 or 1 
Sibling  The number of siblings in the household  Number 
Activity1  Child's active exercise frequency in the last 14 days: 1 if 1 to 2 days; 0 if not  0 or 1 
Activity2  Child's active exercise frequency in the last 14 days: 1 if 3 to 5 days; 0 if not  0 or 1 
Activity3  Child's active exercise frequency in the last 14 days: 1 if 6 to 8 days; 0 if not  0 or 1 
Activity4  Child's active exercise frequency in the last 14 days: 1 if 9 or more days; 0 if not  0 or 1 
FatherBMI  Father's Body Mass Index  Kilograms/meters
2 
MotherBMI  Mother's Body Mass Index  Kilograms/meters
2 
FatherEdu  Father’s education level: grades completed  Rank 
MotherEdu  Mother’s education level: grades completed  Rank 
FatherActive  Father’s active level: 1 to 3 means decreasing active lifestyle  Rank 
MotherActive Mother’s  active level: 1 to 3 means decreasing active lifestyle  Rank 
ToBuy  Father and mother decision power difference in "whether to buy groceries"  Categories 
ToSpend  Father and mother decision power difference in "how much to spend on groceries"  Categories 
   31
Table 2. Summary Statistics for Pooled Model 
Variable N  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent Variables (LHS Variables in the triangular system) 
TotExp   125  690.64  234.30  210.00  1579.00 
FatherPrepTime   125  19.92  24.39  0  114.50 
MotherPrepTime   125  65.26  54.17  0  314.50 
FatherChildTime   125  79.45  112.71  0  967.00 
MotherChildTime 125 90.47  92.19  0  479.50 
KidBMI   125  20.67  4.69  14.35  45.10 
          
Independent Variables (RHS Variables in the triangular system) 
Economic Variables 
FatherIncome 125  77960.90  52834.26  1200.00  370000.00 
MotherIncome 125  32636.60  34118.96  1125.00  212750.00 
FatherTime 125  1001.34  206.00  547.50  1440.00 
MotherTime 125  1136.88  213.46  690.00  1440.00 
FatherWorkDay 125  0.90  0.31  0  1.00 
MotherWorkDay 125 0.80  0.40  0  1.00 
          
Sociological Variables 
FatherSpillover 125  -0.05  0.89  -1.85  2.63 
MotherSpillover 125  0.09  0.76  -1.36  2.34 
FatherHR 125  2.23  0.67  1.00  3.00 
MotherHR 125  2.05  0.81  1.00  3.00 
FatherDay 125  1.77  0.82  1.00  3.00 
MotherDay 125  1.74  0.82 1.00 3.00 
FatherCommit 125  2.43  1.03  1.00  5.00 
MotherCommit 125  1.91  0.80  1.00  4.00 
          
Control Variables 
Age 125  12.27  2.14  9.00  15.00 
Gender 125  0.49  0.50  0  1.00 
White 125  0.79  0.41  0  1.00 
Hispanic 125  0.11  0.32  0  1.00 
Puberty 125  0.88  0.33  0  1.00 
Sibling 125  1.00  0.80  0  1.00 
Activity1 125  0.18  0.39  0  1.00 
Activity2 125  0.25  0.43  0  1.00 
Activity3 125  0.26  0.44  0  1.00 
Activity4 125  0.26  0.44  0  1.00 
FatherBMI 125  27.38  3.66  17.63  36.28 
MotherBMI 125  25.13  5.00 18.09  46.20 
FatherEdu 125  5.88  1.35  3.00  8.00 
MotherEdu 125  6.00  1.24  4.00  8.00 
FatherActive 125  1.60  0.64  1.00  3.00 
MotherActive 125  1.76  0.70  1.00  3.00 
ToBuy 125  0.23  0.82  -2.00  2.00 
ToSpend 125  0.24  0.82  -2.00  2.00 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1.   32
Table 3. Summary Statistics for Children Ages 9 to 11 
Variable N  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent Variables (LHS Variables in the triangular system) 
TotExp   59 674.35  232.22  210.00  1579.00 
FatherPrepTime   59 15.13  19.98  0  80.00 
MotherPrepTime   59  64.89  44.12 0 202.50 
FatherChildTime   59  80.13  78.68 0 419.00 
MotherChildTime  59  111.70  96.61 0 479.50 
KidBMI   59 18.98  3.72  14.35  28.71 
       
Independent Variables (RHS Variables in the triangular system) 
Economic Variables 
FatherIncome  59 79720.08  56609.28  13356.00  370000.00 
MotherIncome  59  29166.46  32958.97 1125.00 160000.00 
FatherTime  59 999.02  215.57  547.50  1440.00 
MotherTime  59 1165.94  212.73  825.00  1440.00 
FatherWorkDay  59 0.90  0.30  0  1.00 
MotherWorkDay  59 0.80  0.41  0  1.00 
       
Sociological Variables 
FatherSpillover  59 -0.05  0.98  -1.66 2.63 
MotherSpillover  59 0.03  0.74  -1.36  1.86 
FatherHR  59 2.24  0.73  1.00 3.00 
MotherHR  59 2.04  0.79  1.00 3.00 
FatherDay  59 1.90  0.88  1.00 3.00 
MotherDay  59 1.76  0.82  1.00 3.00 
FatherCommit  59 2.51  1.04  1.00 5.00 
MotherCommit  59 1.85  0.78  1.00 4.00 
       
Control Variables 
Age  59 10.17  0.79 9.00 11.00 
Gender  59 0.44  0.50  0  1.00 
White  59 0.75  0.44  0  1.00 
Hispanic  59 0.17  0.38  0  1.00 
Puberty  59 0.76  0.43  0  1.00 
Sibling  59 1.07  0.81  0  4.00 
Activity1  59 0.17  0.38  0  1.00 
Activity2  59 0.27  0.45  0  1.00 
Activity3  59 0.32  0.47  0  1.00 
Activity4  59 0.19  0.39  0  1.00 
FatherBMI  59 27.10  3.46  20.08  35.95 
MotherBMI  59 24.35  3.89  18.09  41.20 
FatherEdu  59 5.89  1.32  3.00 8.00 
MotherEdu  59 5.97  1.20  4.00 8.00 
FatherActive  59 1.61  0.64  1.00 3.00 
MotherActive  59 1.71  0.62  1.00 3.00 
ToBuy  59 0.20  0.76  -2.00  2.00 
ToSpend  59 0.19  0.86  -2.00  2.00 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1.   33
Table 4. Summary Statistics for Children Ages 13 to 15 
Variable N  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent Variables (LHS Variables in the triangular system) 
TotExp   66 705.20  236.97  250.00  1460.00 
FatherPrepTime   66  24.21  27.19 0 114.50 
MotherPrepTime   66  65.59  62.14 0 314.50 
FatherChildTime   66 78.84  136.78 0  967.00 
MotherChildTime  66  71.50  84.33 0 442.50 
KidBMI   66 22.19  4.96  14.80  45.10 
       
Independent Variables (RHS Variables in the triangular system) 
Economic Variables 
FatherIncome  66  76388.30  49602.69 1200.00 283044.00 
MotherIncome  66  35738.70  35081.92 2400.00 212750.00 
FatherTime  66 1003.42  198.69  607.50  1440.00 
MotherTime  66 1110.91  212.34  690.00  1440.00 
FatherWorkDay  66 0.89  0.31  0  1.00 
MotherWorkDay  66 0.80  0.40  0  1.00 
       
Sociological Variables 
FatherSpillover  66 -0.05  0.82  -1.85 2.19 
MotherSpillover  66 0.13  0.79  -1.31  2.34 
FatherHR  66 2.23  0.63  1.00 3.00 
MotherHR  66 2.02  0.85  1.00 3.00 
FatherDay  66 1.65  0.73  1.00 3.00 
MotherDay  66 1.73  0.83  1.00 3.00 
FatherCommit  66 2.36  1.03  1.00 5.00 
MotherCommit  66 1.97  0.82  1.00 4.00 
       
Control Variables 
Age  66 14.12  0.81  13.00  15.00 
Gender  66 0.53  0.50  0  1.00 
White  66 0.83  0.38  0  1.00 
Hispanic  66 0.06  0.24  0  1.00 
Puberty  66 0.98  0.12  0  1.00 
Sibling  66 0.94  0.80  0  3.00 
Activity1  66 0.20  0.40  0  1.00 
Activity2  66 0.23  0.42  0  1.00 
Activity3  66 0.20  0.40  0  1.00 
Activity4  66 0.33  0.48  0  1.00 
FatherBMI  66 27.63  3.83  17.63  36.28 
MotherBMI  66 25.82  5.75  18.88  46.20 
FatherEdu  66 5.86  1.38  3.00 8.00 
MotherEdu  66 6.03  1.29  4.00 8.00 
FatherActive  66 1.59  0.63  1.00 3.00 
MotherActive  66 1.82  0.76  1.00 3.00 
ToBuy  66 0.26  0.88  -2.00  2.00 
ToSpend  66 0.29  0.78  -1.00  2.00 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1.   34
Table 5. The Obesity-Related Health Production Function Results 
   Pooled Model  Age 9 to 11  Age 13 to 15 
Variables   IT3SLS ITSUR  IT3SLS  ITSUR  IT3SLS  ITSUR 
Intercept 1.65*  1.67*  2.58*  2.59*  1.12  1.34** 
 (0.48)  (0.30)  (0.70)  (0.59)  (0.74)  (0.74) 
TotExp 2.75E-04  3.04E-04*  1.32E-04 1.39E-04  -0.14E-03  0.20E-03 
 (1.90E-04)  (0.72E-05)  (2.09E-04)  (0.89E-04) (2.24E-04) (1.38E-04) 
FatherPrepTime -2.4E-04  4.80E-04  -3.68E-03 -3.58E-03* -0.43E-03  -5.08-06 
 (2.33E-03)  (6.69E-04)  (3.20E-03)  (1.17E-03) (2.81E-03) (8.96E-04) 
MotherPrepTime 5.73E-04  7.50E-04*  5.31E-04 5.57E-04 1.16E-03  1.53E-03* 
 (7.90E-04)  (3.12E-04)  (1.12E-03)  (5.51E-04) (7.83E-04) (4.03E-04) 
FatherChildTime -5.30E-04  -0.79E-03*  -0.68E-03 -0.73E-03* -0.09E-03 -0.44E-04* 
 (5.39E-04)  (1.41E-04)  (7.21E-04)  (2.56E-04) (4.89E-04) (1.79E-04) 
MotherChildTime -2.90E-04  -0.33E-03**  -0.67E-03 -0.71E-03* -0.29E-03 -0.67E-03* 
 (8.15E-04)  (1.88E-04)  (7.33E-04)  (2.40E-04) (8.07E-04) (3.12E-04) 
FatherSpillover -0.03  -0.03  -0.045  -0.05  -0.03  -0.02 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
MotherSpillover 0.04  0.04  0.10 0.10*  -4.46E-03  -0.03 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
Age 0.03**  0.02**  -0.01  -0.01  0.07**  0.07** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Gender 0.04  0.04  0.15**  0.15* -0.05 -0.07 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
White -0.05  -0.05  -0.01  0.01  -0.05  -0.02 
 (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.11) 
Hispanic -0.08  -0.09  -0.12  -0.13  -0.16  -0.14 
 (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.16) 
Sibling 0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05) 
Puberty 0.09  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.09  0.08 
 (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.07)  (0.22)  (0.25) 
FatherEdu 1.45E-03  -5.02E-03  -0.02 -0.02  9.87E-03  0.94E-04 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
MotherEdu -5.29E-03  -6.92E-03 -0.04  -0.04  0.03  0.04 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
FatherActive -0.02 -0.02  -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
MotherActive 0.04  0.04  0.03  0.03  -0.04  -0.02 
 (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Activity1 0.26*  0.27*  0.32**  0.32*  0.18  0.20 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.14)  (0.19)  (0.19) 
Activity2 0.25*  0.26*  0.17  0.17  0.33*  0.38* 
 (0.12)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.19)  (0.18) 
Activity3 0.29*  0.31*  0.30**  0.30*  0.27  0.32** 
 (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.14)  (0.20)  (0.18) 
Activity4 0.26*  0.29*  0.24  0.24  0.17  0.20 
 (0.13)  (0.11)  (0.17)  (0.15)  (0.20)  (0.17) 
FatherBMI 0.01  0.01**  7.67E-03  7.70E-03 8.95E-03 8.06E-03 
 (7.54E-03)  (6.26E-03)  (8.55E-03)  (8.07E-03) (8.25E-03) (8.90E-03) 
MotherBMI 9.87E-03*  9.90E-03*  9.65E-03 9.59E-03  0.01**  0.01** 
 (4.86E-03)  (4.87E-03)  (8.47E-03)  (8.21E-03) (6.14E-03) (6.54E-03) 
ToBuy -0.02  -0.02  0.01  0.01  -0.04  -0.05 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.05) 
ToSpend -0.04  -0.04  -0.10*  -0.10*  0.05  0.07 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.06) 
Note: Numbers in (.) are standard errors; * : 5% significance level; **: 10% significance level. Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1.   35
Table 6. Health Input Demand Results (ITSUR): Pooled Model 
Variables    TotExp  FatherPrepTime  MotherPrepTime FatherChildTime MotherChildTime 
          
Intercept 342.80  -3.05  181.67**  33.46  235.66 
 (409.99)  (46.76)  (97.00)  (201.29)  (172.30) 
FatherIncome 1.65E-03*  -7.00E-05 2.42E-06 2.98E-04 -1.20E-04 
 (4.12E-04)  (4.80E-05)  (1.00E-04) (1.92E-04)  1.78E-04 
MotherIncome 1.81E-03*  2.77E-04*  -3.10E-04** 3.19E-04  -4.40E-04 
 (7.27E-04)  (8.50E-05)  (1.77E-04) (3.40E-04)  3.15E-04 
FatherSpillover 64.05*  2.49  4.33  7.14  12.84 
 (25.92)  (2.84)  (5.88)  (13.50)  (10.45) 
MotherSpillover -9.95  -2.60  -5.59  -31.43**  16.17 
 (31.40)  (3.44)  (7.14)  (16.33)  (12.67) 
FatherHR -22.49 2.78  -7.94  -29.15**  -4.20 
 (33.80)  (4.00)  (8.30)  (15.53)  (14.76) 
FatherDay 62.98*  -0.68  8.23  -4.13  5.82 
 (29.14)  (3.45)  (7.16)  (13.40)  (12.72) 
MotherHR -28.38  -1.14  -8.96  -15.01  21.10 
 (29.84)  (3.52)  (7.32)  (13.76)  (13.01) 
MotherDay  18.77  3.87  5.76 34.45* -2.62 
 (32.93)  (3.89)  (8.08)  (15.15)  (14.37) 
FatherCommit -38.65**  -5.03*  -6.00  -5.46  5.03 
 (20.65)  (2.44)  (5.06)  (9.55)  (8.99) 
MotherCommit 49.45*  -1.70  10.75**  -28.31*  6.85 
 (24.28)  (2.87)  (5.96)  (11.18)  (10.60) 
Gender -72.34**  1.31  -0.71  4.63  16.30 
 (43.52)  (4.76)  (9.86)  (22.72)  (17.50) 
White 15.27  11.32  -15.00  2.65 30.93 
 (74.84)  (8.22)  (17.04)  (38.85)  (30.24) 
Hispanic 134.25  14.13  -14.01  17.24  -12.98 
 (93.04)  (10.12)  (20.98)  (48.89)  (37.23) 
Age 7.52  1.78  4.97*  0.45  -4.72 
 (11.15)  (1.22)  (2.52)  (5.84)  (4.47) 
Puberty 10.06  7.48  -19.78 -10.95 -43.30 
 (73.95)  (8.09)  (16.77)  (38.56)  (29.77) 
Sibling 17.21  -4.85  -3.19 -15.53  18.69** 
 (27.42)  (2.98)  (6.18)  (14.42)  (10.97)   36
Table 6. Continued 
Variables   TotExp  FatherPrepTime  MotherPrepTime  FatherChildTime  MotherChildTime 
         
FatherEdu -1.07  0.31  -0.50  -13.52  -7.10 
 (17.03)  (1.85)  (3.83)  (8.98)  (6.79) 
MotherEdu -0.87 -2.09  -4.04  -3.86  1.15 
 (21.59)  (2.37)  (4.92)  (11.19)  (8.73) 
FatherActive 5.58  -5.92 0.75  -38.55*  11.19 
 (36.62)  (3.99)  (8.27)  (19.21)  (14.67) 
Motheractive 3.14  4.99  -18.36*  47.14*  -35.54* 
 (37.16)  (4.09)  (8.47)  (19.26)  (15.03) 
Activity1 -29.58  6.25  -12.16  89.03  -24.99 
 (108.53)  (11.88)  (24.61)  (56.62)  (43.68) 
Activity2 -46.54  0.73  -4.27  92.95**  -53.81 
 (107.60)  (11.74)  (24.32)  (56.36)  (43.17) 
Activity3  44.81  -4.07 -6.92 72.25  -32.69 
 (105.33)  (11.49)  (23.80)  (55.20)  (42.24) 
Activity4 -48.44  -4.18  -21.34  97.63**  -58.67 
 (108.75)  (11.89)  (24.65)  (56.78)  (43.74) 
FatherBMI -6.48 -0.10  -1.55  2.18  -4.32** 
 (6.10)  (0.67)  (1.38)  (3.19)  (2.45) 
MotherBMI -0.96  -0.78  -0.83  -1.56  0.13 
 (4.72)  (0.51)  (1.07)  (2.48)  (1.89) 
FatherTime 0.10  0.02 -0.05 0.10 -0.04 
 (0.14)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
MotherTime 0.03  0.01  0.08*  0.04  0.10 
 (0.14)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.06) 
ToBuy -25.54  2.09  -2.52  -17.43  -0.24 
 (29.78)  (3.23)  (6.69)  (15.72)  (11.88) 
ToSpend 85.73*  -0.27  4.58  -0.85  12.75 
 (31.97)  (3.49)  (7.22)  (16.76)  (12.82) 
FatherWorkDay 115.55  -9.82  -36.75  -31.70  -22.95 
 (97.27)  (11.50)  (23.88)  (44.76)  (42.44) 
MotherWorkDay -15.27  4.20  -8.10  13.93  53.60** 
   (68.26)  (8.08)  (16.77)  (31.37)  (29.80) 
 
Note: Numbers in (.) are standard errors; * : 5% significance level; **: 10% significance level. 
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Table 7. Health Input Demand Results (ITSUR): Age 9 to 11 Model 
Variables    TotExp  FatherPrepTime  MotherPrepTime FatherChildTime MotherChildTime 
          
Intercept 783.81  83.79  68.74  438.26  -28.36 
 (1043.78)  (83.23)  (156.99)  (361.49)  (384.85) 
FatherIncome 1.07E-03 -1.30E-04** -1.30E-04  4.58E-04  -2.40E-04 
 (8.21E-04)  (6.70E-05)  (1.26E-04) (2.77E-04) (2.95E-04) 
MotherIncome 4.74E-03*  8.70E-05  -8.00E-05 2.33E-04 -1.50E-04 
 (1.68E-03)  (1.37E-04)  (2.60E-04) (5.67E-04) (6.02E-04) 
FatherSpillover 83.90  -0.64  -7.81  20.75  32.78 
 (58.02)  (4.62)  (8.72)  (20.12)  (21.42) 
MotherSpillover  -83.50  0.30 -14.98  21.04 28.15 
 (78.75)  (6.26)  (11.79)  (27.39)  (29.17) 
FatherHR 27.15 -1.48  -3.35  -20.07  -17.11 
 (66.57)  (5.46)  (10.34)  (22.31)  (23.66) 
FatherDay 54.58  4.34  -1.62  -5.55  9.61 
 (55.94)  (4.58)  (8.67)  (18.78)  (19.92) 
MotherHR -58.25  0.39  -12.66  -13.51  -3.08 
 (65.23)  (5.34)  (10.10)  (21.95)  (23.29) 
MotherDay 16.26  -0.61  23.02*  35.82  -6.06 
 (69.03)  (5.64)  (10.66)  (23.27)  (24.70) 
FatherCommit -82.62  -2.60  -2.17  -26.11  -11.35 
 (50.24)  (4.11)  (7.77)  (16.91)  (17.95) 
MotherCommit 80.51  -6.28  7.89  -24.84  -1.17 
 (57.53)  (4.69)  (8.88)  (19.43)  (20.62) 
Gender -69.85  9.81  -2.75  14.43  52.14 
 (101.49)  (8.04)  (15.15)  (35.41)  (37.73) 
White -169.15  14.98 15.35  2.21  -29.84 
 (148.91)  (11.73)  (22.09)  (52.24)  (55.70) 
Hispanic -110.92  -3.72  8.90  19.57  -106.44 
 (195.45)  (15.41)  (29.02)  (68.50)  (73.02) 
Age 17.00  -0.47  16.45**  -25.81  14.92 
 (61.95)  (4.89)  (9.21)  (21.69)  (23.12) 
Puberty -47.23  6.48  -24.26  27.44  -28.78 
 (113.26)  (8.95)  (16.86)  (39.60)  (42.21) 
Sibling -78.58  -1.72  -0.80  1.93  -8.83 
 (66.39)  (5.24)  (9.87)  (23.25)  (24.78)   38
Table 7. Continued 
Variables   TotExp  FatherPrepTime  MotherPrepTime  FatherChildTime  MotherChildTime 
         
FatherEdu -17.77  -2.64  -2.44  -5.07  -17.44 
 (32.60)  (2.56)  (4.81)  (11.49)  (12.26) 
MotherEdu -39.22 -6.49  -8.12  -8.92  -14.64 
 (53.12)  (4.21)  (7.93)  (18.52)  (19.74) 
FatherActive -21.34  -4.40 2.86  -40.40**  16.29 
 (62.90)  (4.94)  (9.30)  (22.12)  (23.59) 
Motheractive -34.84  -2.20  -14.05  5.59  -45.93 
 (79.31)  (6.27)  (11.81)  (27.73)  (29.55) 
Activity1 -130.02  34.20*  -3.53  125.36**  -33.95 
 (195.79)  (15.37)  (28.95)  (68.88)  (73.46) 
Activity2 359.40**  18.76  28.43  93.16  -59.67 
 (181.61)  (14.24)  (26.81)  (63.98)  (68.24) 
Activity3 -167.85  17.94  30.79  79.17  -58.09 
 (199.12)  (15.65)  (29.48)  (69.98)  (74.63) 
Activity4 -184.41  13.67  6.24  61.27  -64.39 
 (205.67)  (16.13)  (30.36)  (72.46)  (77.29) 
FatherBMI -3.97 -0.04  -3.00  2.61  -3.84 
 (12.02)  (0.95)  (1.78)  (4.21)  (4.49) 
MotherBMI 5.14  -1.85**  0.90  -1.77  -1.90 
 (11.88)  (0.93)  (1.75)  (4.18)  (4.46) 
FatherTime 0.07  0.01 -0.07 0.16  0.20** 
 (0.29)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.11) 
MotherTime 0.31  0.02  0.07  -0.14  0.23* 
 (0.28)  (0.02)  (0.04)  (0.10)  (0.10) 
ToBuy -39.83  -2.43  0.16  -2.78  -34.84 
 (70.93)  (5.58)  (10.50)  (24.92)  (26.57) 
ToSpend 36.13  -3.60  2.33  -14.73  14.29 
 (57.72)  (4.54)  (8.54)  (20.29)  (21.64) 
FatherWorkDay 33.80  -12.21  -59.23  25.66  27.33 
 (186.21)  (15.23)  (28.81)  (62.67)  (66.49) 
MotherWorkDay -61.29  18.46  2.30  -34.80  104.14* 
   (141.19)  (11.55)  (21.84)  (47.52)  (50.42) 
 
Note: Numbers in (.) are standard errors; * : 5% significance level; **: 10% significance level. 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1.  39
Table 8. Health Input Demand Results (ITSUR): Age 13 to 15 Model 
Variables    TotExp  FatherPrepTime  MotherPrepTime FatherChildTime MotherChildTime 
          
Intercept 736.14  -26.20  204.40  -917.03  346.92 
 (848.98)  (147.12)  (307.19)  (694.45)  (407.72) 
FatherIncome 3.24E-03*  -9.00E-05 2.70E-05 -1.60E-04 -2.50E-04 
 (5.99E-04)  (1.04E-04)  (2.16E-04) (4.81E-04) (2.86E-04) 
MotherIncome 7.07E-04  2.02E-04  -8.20E-04* -9.00E-05 -9.90E-04* 
 (9.74E-04)  (1.69E-04)  (3.47E-04) (7.54E-04) (4.58E-04) 
FatherSpillover 71.24**  -5.32  1.94  -29.05  -5.67 
 (36.71)  (6.35)  (13.58)  (32.17)  (18.15) 
MotherSpillover -27.64  -1.29  4.81  -52.11  -14.39 
 (37.82)  (6.54)  (14.03)  (33.44)  (18.77) 
FatherHR -92.00** 1.61  -12.52  -27.77  -16.10 
 (49.15)  (8.53)  (17.41)  (37.33)  (22.94) 
FatherDay 93.07*  -4.33  12.60  -20.44  -3.38 
 (41.70)  (7.23)  (14.77)  (31.71)  (19.47) 
MotherHR 40.37  -4.22  -4.90  -51.05  31.20 
 (40.25)  (6.98)  (14.28)  (30.77)  (18.83) 
MotherDay -38.23  7.15  -7.38  68.58**  -25.84 
 (45.72)  (7.93)  (16.23)  (34.99)  (21.40) 
FatherCommit -39.56  -6.98  -10.36  17.28  6.50 
 (27.82)  (4.83)  (9.87)  (21.24)  (13.01) 
MotherCommit 21.92  3.02  33.17*  -59.19*  -0.84 
 (38.31)  (6.65)  (13.57)  (29.09)  (17.88) 
Gender -121.56*  -1.22  -7.93  13.67  -37.58 
 (47.53)  (8.22)  (17.72)  (42.64)  (23.74) 
White -36.90  1.88 -49.58 3.84  34.72 
 (103.49)  (17.92)  (37.91)  (88.05)  (50.51) 
Hispanic 148.23  -2.59  -41.75  -27.05  -13.38 
 (130.43)  (22.57)  (48.25)  (114.34)  (64.49) 
Age -57.81  6.17  -4.33  57.90**  4.64 
 (37.23)  (6.45)  (13.65)  (31.77)  (18.20) 
Puberty 96.68  -3.15  18.30 -68.45  6.13 
 (199.79)  (34.56)  (74.22)  (177.42)  (99.34) 
Sibling 83.12*  -6.28  -10.19 -31.74  3.27 
 (36.23)  (6.27)  (13.47)  (32.25)  (18.03)   40
Table 8. Continued 
Variables   TotExp  FatherPrepTime  MotherPrepTime  FatherChildTime  MotherChildTime 
         
FatherEdu -0.66  5.60  9.08  -2.18  10.39 
 (22.15)  (3.83)  (8.20)  (19.48)  (10.96) 
MotherEdu 10.13 -2.00  -7.53  7.11  3.04 
 (24.32)  (4.21)  (9.02)  (21.47)  (12.06) 
FatherActive 7.01  1.44 5.79  -21.38  -8.15 
 (49.63)  (8.59)  (18.43)  (44.02)  (24.66) 
Motheractive 108.87*  -1.98  -26.15  18.93  -60.39* 
 (53.83)  (9.32)  (19.74)  (45.95)  (26.31) 
Activity1 44.63  -36.39  -56.62  60.94  -54.12 
 (168.20)  (29.12)  (61.79)  (144.37)  (82.40) 
Activity2 151.85  -33.36  -56.67  100.33  -64.99 
 (149.40)  (25.85)  (55.28)  (131.09)  (73.89) 
Activity3 236.46  -47.62  -90.20  31.15  -58.59 
 (167.63)  (29.02)  (61.52)  (143.50)  (82.03) 
Activity4 54.35  -35.29  -67.39  88.30  -106.41 
 (152.04)  (26.32)  (55.98)  (131.41)  (74.71) 
FatherBMI -0.62 -0.30  -1.51  4.33  -1.86 
 (7.74)  (1.34)  (2.85)  (6.70)  (3.80) 
MotherBMI -9.18  -0.42  -0.47  1.19  0.58 
 (5.65)  (0.98)  (2.08)  (4.90)  (2.78) 
FatherTime 0.08  0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.22* 
 (0.21)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.16)  (0.10) 
MotherTime 0.09  0.02  0.14**  0.25  0.08 
 (0.20)  (0.03)  (0.07)  (0.15)  (0.09) 
ToBuy -61.06**  6.43  6.71  -27.74  11.24 
 (33.61)  (5.81)  (12.50)  (29.91)  (16.73) 
ToSpend 105.33*  5.73  9.92  21.46  28.49 
 (43.95)  (7.61)  (16.20)  (38.15)  (21.64) 
FatherWorkDay 211.12  -24.79  -12.58  -184.69**  -67.73 
 (143.32)  (24.86)  (50.92)  (110.09)  (67.17) 
MotherWorkDay 18.95  6.62  12.15  104.29  49.50 
   (101.89)  (17.68)  (36.06)  (77.21)  (47.52) 
 
Note: Numbers in (.) are standard errors; * : 5% significance level; **: 10% significance level. 
Variable definitions can be found in Appendix Table 1. 
 